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For the third time in a span of five years, a country has brought suit
against the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for
violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) in
capital cases.' And, for the third time, the ICJ has issued an order of pro-
visional measures. The most recent order indicates that: "[t]he United
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that [three named
Mexican defendants] are not executed pending final judgment in these
proceedings."2
Each case is contributing to the evolution of a new and growing field
in criminal cases, especially capital cases, of rights based on
international treaties. A decision from the ICJ binds the countries that are
parties to the litigation.3 The United States has agreed to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ for disputes regarding the interpretation or
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I would like
to thank Michael Millman, Sandra Babcock, Mark Warren, Ellen Podgor, and Justice Richard
Goldstone for providing helpful suggestions on this essay. I would also like to thank John
Fowler for his outstanding research assistance. All views and errors are, of course, mine.
1. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 128 (Feb. 5) (order
of provisional measures); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999
I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3) (order of provisional measures); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 99 (Nov. 10).
2. Avena, 2003 I.C.J. at [ 59. In the two earlier cases, the provisional measures order
was substantially the same, but indicated that the United States "should" take all measures "at
its disposal" to prevent the executions. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (F.R.G.
v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 129 (Mar. 3) (stating that "[t]he United States ... should take all
measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final deci-
sion in these proceedings ....") (emphasis added); see also, Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 99, 41 (Nov. 10) (same).
3. U.N. CHARTER art. 59.
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application of the VCCR. Thus, the cases brought before the ICJ are
highly significant in the development of the requirements imposed on the
United States under the VCCR. There are also unresolved issues about
the effect of an ICJ judgment in domestic criminal cases.5 As a result, the
most recent case, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United
States), will likely reverberate in the court systems for some time to
come.
Although many aspects of the Avena case could lead to significant
developments, there are two that I will address in this essay. The first
issue has an immediate impact on the pending executions. What must the
United States do to comply with the provisional measures order?6 What
4. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. I, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.
5. One of the most complex issues is the effect of an ICJ decision on the merits in
subsequent domestic litigation in an individual capital case. There is considerable debate
about the effect of an ICJ decision in domestic law. See Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145 (10th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. (forthcoming 2003) (No. 03-5781, 2003 Term), slip op. at 2
(Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (referring to the LaGrand decision as an "au-
thoritative" interpretation of the VCCR) and slip op. at 6-7 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari) (noting the unresolved issues involving the impact of ICJ decisions on
domestic cases), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/03relatingtoorders.html
(last visited Jan. 15, 2004); see also A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and American
Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 877 (2000) (Security Council action is the only enforcement
mechanism for ICJ decisions; it is unconstitutional to attempt by treaty to allow review by
international tribunals of federal or state judgments); Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, Inter-
national Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675 (2003)
(describing a continuum of effect of decisions from international tribunals, with the greatest
effect under a "full faith and credit" model (international tribunal decision is legal judgment),
and decreasing use from: 1) an "arbitration" model (generally enforceable judgments), 2) a
"foreign judgment" model (decision of international tribunal treated in same manner as a
foreign judgment in a U.S. court), 3) the "Charming Betsy" model (interpreting U.S. law in
harmony with international law if possible), 4) "Paquete Habana" model (use of international
decision as persuasive authority), 5) "special master" model (international tribunal functioning
under control of U.S. court), and 6) the "no deference" model (international decision effec-
tively ignored)); Cara Drinan, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations:
Private Enforcement in American Courts After LaGrand, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1303 (2002) (tak-
ing the position that the ICJ decision is binding on American courts). The few court decisions
post-LaGrand that have addressed the effect of the ICJ's decision in that case reflect the de-
bate. Compare U.S. ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, No. 98-C1866, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20170
(N.D. I11. Oct. 21, 2002) (noting that the ICJ decision in LaGrand is binding on the court, but
deciding the case on other grounds) with Commonwealth v. Diemer, 785 N.E.2d 1237 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2003) (noting that "[t]he effect of the LaGrand decision in the United States is un-
clear.. ").
There are also unresolved arguments regarding the Eleventh Amendment's effect on the
ability of a foreign country to sue a state in federal court to enforce the continuing effect of a
violation of the VCCR. See, e.g., Note, Too Sovereign But Not Sovereign Enough: Are U.S.
States Beyond the Reach of the Law of Nations? 116 HARV. L. REV. 2654 (2003) [hereinafter
Too Sovereign?].
6. In this essay, I address what the United States should do to be in compliance with
the provisional measures order of the ICJ, including compelling a state to stay an execution.
As indicated in note 5, supra, legal redress in American courts for the failure of the United
[Vol. 25:117
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are "all measures necessary"? The second issue will have an impact in
later litigation in the cases of the fifty-two Mexican defendants named in
Avena and on other future defendants.7 What must the United States do
to provide "review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by
taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in [the VCCR]"?8
Must there be a "meaningful remedy at law" as Mexico is requesting? 9 Is
clemency sufficient to satisfy these requirements for consideration of the
consular notification issue, as the United States is arguing?'"
I. THE TREATY AND THE COURTS
In the mid-1990s, criminal defense attorneys discovered the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations." Through the pioneering efforts of
Sandra Babcock in her representation of Canadian Stanley Faulder,'2 the
violation of the treaty's consular notification right for detained foreign
nationals began to surface in the litigation of criminal cases. The provi-
sion of the treaty on notification is quite straightforward. It provides, in
pertinent part:
With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions re-
lating to nations of the sending state ... if he so requests, the
competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay,
inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consu-
lar district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other
States itself to comply is a complex issue. The basic enforcement mechanism for ICJ orders is
action by the Security Council of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 2.
7. Although cases before the ICJ directly affect only the parties before the Court, both
Mexico and the United States would have difficulty distinguishing a decision in this case from
any other case involving different foreign nationals under the same treaty. See LaGrand Case
(F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27) (declaration of President Guillaume) (stating that,
though the ICJ Judgment established Article 36 rights between nationals of Germany and the
United States, paragraph 128(7) of the Judgment cannot be applied "a contrario" to "the posi-
tion of nationals of other countries ... .
8. Id. 128(7).
9. Application Instituting Proceedings (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. Pleadings (Avena)
128, 281(5)(3) (Jan. 9, 2003) , available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/
imusorder/imus-iapplication_20030109.PDF (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
10. Verbatim Record (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. Pleadings (Avena) 128, para. 32 (Jan.
21, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuscr/imus-icr2003-03_
20030121.PDF (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
11. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]
12. Faulder v. Johnson, 81 E3d 515 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 995 (1996).
Despite extensive efforts by his attorneys and Canadian authorities, Stanley Faulder was ulti-
mately executed in Texas.
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manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by
the person arrested in prison, custody or detention shall also be
forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said au-
thorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his
rights under this sub-paragraph. 
3
Subsequent to the Faulder case, the violation of the VCCR was
raised in a stream of cases. 4 Although the violations of the notification
provision in case after case were clear,'5 the courts refused to grant relief
of any kind. In the initial cases, the issue was typically not discovered
until federal habeas corpus proceedings. Because the issue had not been
raised in state court, and was now barred under state procedural rules,
the federal courts repeatedly found that the VCCR claim was proce-
durally defaulted and could not be considered in the habeas case.' 6 In
later cases, as more defense attorneys became aware of the issue, the
VCCR violation was raised at the pretrial and state appellate levels. De-
spite the more timely consideration, the courts declined to suppress
evidence" or to grant a dismissal 8 as a result of a VCCR violation. The
most that courts have done is to make indirect use of the VCCR violation
13. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 36(1)(b) (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2002); Bell v. Virginia, 563
S.E. 2d 695 (Va. 2002); Anthony N. Bishop, The Unenforceable Rights to Consular Notifica-
tion and Access in the United States: What's Changed Since the LaGrand Case?, 25 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 1 (2002) (surveying VCCR case law and the implications of the ICJ Order in La-
Grand); see also Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), Requiring that Foreign Consulate be Notified
when one of its Nationals is Arrested, 175 A.L.R. FED. 243 (2002) (surveying VCCR cases by
each defendant's nation of origin).
15. E.g., United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1038 (2002); United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2001); United States
v. Li, 206 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 956 (2000); United States v.
Page, 232 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 United States 1056 (2001); United States
v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026 (2000);
United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 991 (2000); United States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194 (1 1th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1131 (2001); United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d
968 (N.D. Ill. 2002); United States v. Awadallah, 202 F Supp. 2d 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); People
v. Ortiz, 2002 WL 937642 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. May 8, 2002) (unpublished); People v.
Pathan, No. B9445091, 2002 WL 31854948 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. Dec. 13, 2002) (unpub-
lished).
16. E.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); Faulder, 81 F.3d 515.
17. E.g., Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873; United States v. Cowo, 2001 WL 1474774 (1st Cir. Nov.
26, 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 966 (2002); United States v. Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192
(5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 962 (2001); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d
377 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 977 (2002); Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882.
18. E.g., De La Pava, 268 F3d 157; Page, 232 F.3d 536; Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d
1194; Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 17.
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as support for granting relief for ineffective assistance of counsel'9 or a
Miranda violation. 20 Thus, for all practical purposes, the consular notifi-
cation provision remains a right without a remedy in a criminal case.
Concerned about the treatment of their citizens in American courts,
foreign governments began to take legal and diplomatic measures in re-
sponse to the VCCR violations. Although several countries have beenS 21
active behind the scenes or with supporting affidavits, the most promi-
nent legal actions have been taken by Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico.
Each of the three countries intervened on three levels in at least one capi-
tal case involving a citizen of that country. Amicus briefs were filed in
the criminal action, civil lawsuits were initiated against the state in
which the defendant was being prosecuted, and ultimately, the jurisdic-
tion of the ICJ was invoked under the VCCR in an action brought by the
foreign country against the United States.
Seeking the jurisdiction of the ICJ with executions imminent, both
Paraguay in 1998 and Germany in 1999 sought provisional measures to
prevent the executions until the ICJ could hear the actions on the merits.
In each case, the ICJ indicated provisional measures that the United
States "should take all measures at its disposal" to prevent the execu-
22tions .
With the provisional measures as support, both Paraguay and Ger-
many sought, but failed to gain, relief in the United States Supreme
Court. In the consolidated criminal and civil cases involving Paraguayan
Angel Breard, the United States Supreme Court found that Breard's
VCCR claim was procedurally defaulted under habeas corpus rules; that
the VCCR did not provide for a cause of action by a country to challenge
a conviction and sentence; that the Eleventh Amendment barred
19. For example, in U.S. ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 2002 WL 31386480 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
22, 2002), in the course of granting federal habeas on Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance
of counsel grounds, the court stated: "[wihat the Consulate almost certainly would have done
is provided Petitioner with an attorney who would have assisted in obtaining .. . effective
assistance at the sentencing hearing." Similarly, in Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d 703 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2002), the Oklahoma Criminal Appellate Court granted state habeas corpus relief on
ineffective assistance of counsel grounds and stated: "trial counsel did not inform Petitioner he
could have obtained financial, legal and investigative assistance from his consulate .. . In
hindsight ... it is difficult to assess the effect consular assistance, a thorough background
investigation and adequate legal representation would have had." Id.
20. See State v. Ramirez, 732 N.E.2d 1065, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999). In Ramirez, the
court held that Miranda was violated and used the VCCR violation in its reasoning: "if the
Vienna Convention had been complied with ... , the [Miranda] errors would have been
avoided. First, a competent translator would have been present ... Second, the American legal
system would have been explained to appellant...."
21. See Mark Warren, Consular Notification and Assistance: A Guide for Defense At-
torneys, at http://www3.sympatico.ca/aiwarren/attorneys.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
22. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (FR.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Mar.
3); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 99 (Nov. 10).
Fall 20031
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Paraguay's suit against Virginia; and that Paraguay was not a "person"
for purposes of bringing a federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983.23 Similarly, the Supreme Court denied Germany's action based
on the original jurisdiction of the Court, in which Germany was seeking,
inter alia, an injunction to preclude the execution of Walter LaGrand 4
Angel Breard was executed in Virginia on April 14, 1998, and Walter
LaGrand was executed in Arizona on March 3, 1999.25
Although Paraguay abandoned its action before the ICJ after
Breard's execution, 26 Germany proceeded with its case to a decision on
the merits. The case was based on the violation of the consular notifica-
tion provisions of the VCCR for two brothers, Karl and Walter LaGrand.
Both were executed in Arizona prior to the ICJ's decision on the merits.
In June 2001, the ICJ issued a judgment in LaGrand (ER.G. v. United
States) with numerous findings." One of the critical issues was whether
or not the provisional measures order had binding effect. The ICJ found
that provisional measures are binding upon the parties and that the
United States had failed to comply with the order." Other critical issues
related to the rights and responsibilities under the VCCR. The violation
of the treaty in failing to advise Walter and Karl LaGrand of their notifi-
cation right was uncontested, 29 but the other submissions by Germany
were contested. In its decision, the ICJ found that the VCCR confers
rights not only on a country, but also on individuals, ° an issue that
American courts had generally sidestepped.3 The ICJ further found that
23. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). Paraguay's claims were both a petition for
certiorari and an action based on original jurisdiction.
24. ER.G. v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999).
25. See Death Penalty information Center, Executions, at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?did=414&scid=8 (last visited Oct. 17, 2003) (providing a listing by date of those
executed in the U.S. since 1976). Although the LaGrand case involved both Walter and Karl
LaGrand, Karl had already been executed in Arizona at the time of the provisional measures
from the ICJ.
26. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 99 (Nov. 10).
27. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (ER.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3).
28. Id. R 109, 110.
29. Id. IN 39, 40.
30. Id. 126.
31. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (stating that the VCCR "arguably
confers on an individual the right to consular assistance"). Subsequent to Bread, most courts
have found it unnecessary to decide if the VCCR confers individual rights because, even if it
did, no remedy was available in the case. See, e.g., United States v. Li, 206 E3d 56, 63-64 (1st
Cir. 2000) (en banc); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 E3d 377, 391 (6th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied 535 U.S. 977 (2002) United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir.
2000); United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied
534 U.S. 992 (2001); United States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 E3d 1194, 1196 (1lth Cir.
2000), cert. denied sub nom; Zuniga v. United States, 531 U.S. 113 (2001). Compare Sorensen
v. City of New York, 2000 WL 1528282 (S.D. N.Y. Oct. 13, 2000) (jury award in a Section
1983 case for violation of VCCR set aside on basis no individual right of action for civil liabil-
[Vol. 25:117
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the United States violated the VCCR by failing to provide consideration
of the VCCR issue. Although the treaty provides that the laws of the "re-
ceiving State" (the country in which the action takes place; here, the
United States) shall apply, those laws "must enable full effect to be given
to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are in-
tended."3 In the case of the LaGrand brothers, the ICJ found that the
federal habeas "procedural default" rule precluded the "full effect" in
violation of the VCCR.33 In future cases involving German nationals,'
the ICJ found that the United States must "allow the review and recon-
sideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the
violation of the rights set forth in [the VCCR]."35 In the same sentence,
the ICJ stated that the United States can comply with the review and re-
consideration "by means of its own choosing. 36
In the wake of the ICJ decision in Germany's case and repeated un-
successful efforts at resolving VCCR violations in American courts,
Mexico brought an action against the United States before the ICJ in
January 2003. . Like Germany, Mexico is seeking relief based on viola-
tions of the VCCR. Unlike Germany's case involving two German
nationals, Mexico's case is based on fifty-two Mexican nationals on
death row in nine states in the United States.38 Building on the precedent
of the German case, Mexico seeks a judgment that the United States:
ity under the treaty), with United States v. Garcia-Meza, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8318 (W.D.
Mich. 2003) (indicating individual rights exist under VCCR on basis of decision in LaGrand,
but denying motion to suppress evidence); United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74
(D. Mass. 1999) (finding individual right conferred under VCCR in criminal prosecution, but
notification provision not triggered as defendant was not "detained"); Standt v. City of New
York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding VCCR confers individual right and plain-
tiff has standing to bring a § 1983 claim).
32. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 36(2).
33. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, 90, 91, 125 (June 27).
34. See id. 128(7) (indicating that the ICJ's judgment controls the rights conferred
under Article 36 of the VCCR as between German nationals and the United States). But see
supra note 5 and accompanying text (indicating that the rights conferred under Article 36 of
the VCCR as between Germany and the United States are applicable to other foreign nationals
as well).
35. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, 1 125 (June 27).
36. Id.
37. Application Instituting Proceedings (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. Pleadings (Avena)
128, 281(5)(3) (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/
imusorder/imus-iapplication_20030109.PDF (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
38. The original application named 54 Mexican nationals in 10 states. Id. para. 1.
Through several amendments to the pleadings, the total as of the oral hearing was 52
Mexican nationals in 9 states. Oral Arguments (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. Pleadings (Avena),
80, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuscr/imusicr2003-24_
20031215.PDF (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). The nine states are: California (28), Texas (15),
Illinois (3), Arizona (1), Arkansas (1), Nevada (1), Oklahoma (1), Ohio (1), and Oregon (1). E-
mail from Mark Warren, Human Rights Research, to author (Dec. 22, 2003) (on file with
author).
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1) must afford restitutio in integrum or the restoration of the situation
prior to the convictions and sentences, 9 and 2) must provide a "meaning-
ful remedy at law," which includes preventing procedural rules, such as
procedural default, from precluding "full effect" being given to the rights
under the treaty.40 As a preliminary matter, Mexico sought provisional
measures to ensure that the named Mexican individuals would not be
executed before the ICJ could decide the merits of the case. On February
5, 2003, the ICJ issued the provisional measures order that is cited at the
beginning of this essay. The order provides that the United States "shall
take all measures necessary" to prevent the executions of three of the
named individuals whose executions in Texas and Oklahoma were the
most imminent.
4'
Among the issues raised by the Mexican case are 1) what the United
States must do to comply with the provisional measures order and 2) what
the United States must do to provide "review and reconsideration" of the
convictions and sentences. Each of these issues will be discussed below.
II. PROVISIONAL MEASURES
Much like an injunction in a domestic case, the ICJ issues "provi-
sional measures" to preserve the status quo until there is a resolution on
the merits. Until the LaGrand decision, it was unclear if the provisional
measures were binding. The United States took the position that provi-
sional measures were not binding. In accord with its position that the
provisional measures were not binding, the United States did very little
to secure compliance with the measures. In fact, the Solicitor General
affirmatively argued in the Supreme Court in the LaGrand case that the
39. Id. 281(2).
40. Id. 11 281(l),(3),(5). Mexico also asked the ICJ to adjudge and declare that the
United States has violated the VCCR; that the United States not violate the VCCR in the fu-
ture; and that the ICJ find "that the right to consular notification under the Vienna Convention
is a human right ..... Id. 128(5).
41. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Order of Feb. 5, 2003, Provi-
sional Measures, 2003 I.C.J. at 59 (Feb. 5), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idocket/imus/imusorder/imusiorder_20030205.PDF (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). Although
Mexico was trying to avoid the eve-of-execution situation that arose in LaGrand, which made
compliance with the provisional measures difficult for the United States, the United States
argued that Mexico's request for the indication of provisional measures was premature, stat-
ing: "Mexico did not satisfy the condition of urgency and did not show that imminent serious
harm was likely, because United States proceedings in each of the fifty-one cases were con-
tinuing and none of the Mexican nationals covered . . . [were] scheduled to be executed." Id. at
31, 53.
[Vol. 25:117
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42
measures were non-binding. Not surprisingly, the ICJ found that "by
failing to take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand
was not executed pending the final decision of the International Court of
Justice in the case, the United States of America breached the obligation
incumbent upon it under the Order indicating provisional meas-
" 43
ures ....
What measures did the United States take? The ICJ lists the actions
by the United States that it viewed as responsive to the provisional order.
First, as required by the provisional order, the United States transmitted
the content of the order to the Governor of Arizona. The ICJ considered
this inadequate where the United States merely sent the text of the order,
"without any comment, particularly without even so much as a plea for a
temporary stay."- The ICJ further criticized the position of the Solicitor
General before the United States Supreme Court that the provisional
measures were non-binding. Second, reacting to the refusal to grant a
stay of execution, the ICJ observed that the Governor of Arizona "de-
cided not to give effect to [the provisional measures] .'46 Third, the ICJ
identified the refusal of the United States Supreme Court to grant a stay
41
of execution until that Court could hear the issues.
Several points are worth noting about the ICJ's finding that the
United States did not comply with the provisional measures order. The
ICJ was looking for compliance through authorities on the federal and
state levels. Thus, not only were the State Department's actions scruti-
nized, but also the actions of the state of Arizona. Similarly, the actions
of both the executive and judicial branches of the federal government
were part of the analysis. The refusal of the United States Supreme Court
to grant a stay was a factor, just as the position of the Solicitor General
and the actions of the State Department were factors. In addition to criti-
cizing the actions of the United States, the ICJ also suggested that there
was some flexibility in what constitutes compliance, depending on the
circumstances. The ICJ indicated that if Germany had requested relief,
42. ER.G. v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 113 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
the Solicitor General's position that the provisional measures were not binding); LaGrand
Case (ER.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, 96, 112 (June 27).
43. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, 1 128(5) (June 27).
44. Id. 112. The ICJ added that the transmission also failed to include "an explanation
that there is no general agreement on the position of the United States that orders of the Inter-
national Court of Justice on provisional measures are non-binding ..... Id.
45. Id. The ICJ commented that the position taken by the Solicitor General in LaGrand
went beyond the position taken by the Solicitor General in Breard that there was "substantial
disagreement" whether or not the provisional measures were binding. Id.
46. Id. 113. The ICJ further commented on the fact that the "Arizona Clemency Board
had recommended a stay of execution for Walter LaGrand." Id. Thus, the ICJ very carefully
examined the dynamics on the state level as well as on a federal level.
47. Id. T 114.
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which it did not, for the failure to comply with the provisional order, the
ICJ would have considered the "time pressure" under which the United
States was operating on the eve of the execution and the fact that the
binding nature of the provisional orders was undecided at that time. 8
What then should the United States do to comply with the provi-
sional measures order in Avena? The answer to this question can be
divided into two parts. The first is to rectify the inadequacies in the at-
tempt to comply with the LaGrand order. The second is to identify
measures that could or should be taken above and beyond those dis-
cussed in LaGrand.
In LaGrand, the ICJ criticized the actions of the United States as
performed by the federal State Department and Justice Department, the
state Governor, and the United States Supreme Court. At a minimum, to
respond to the statements of the ICJ in the LaGrand case, the State De-
partment should not only transmit the provisional measures order to
Texas and Oklahoma, but should also include a "plea," a request, or a
demand for a stay of execution. It would also appear advisable for the
State Department to explain the ICJ finding that the order is binding on
the United States and, therefore, on each individual state. Presumably,
the Solicitor General's Office will also modify its position in briefs to
reflect the finding of the ICJ that the provisional measures are binding.
The clemency authorities in Texas and Oklahoma should grant stays of
execution under their state procedures until there is a final resolution in
the ICJ. 49 In the LaGrand case, the ICJ commented that "the various
competent United States authorities failed to take all the steps they could
have taken to give effect to the Court's Order."5 Granting a stay of exe-
cution is a step that the states can take in response to the order. If the
states fail to act, and the cases are brought before the United States Su-
preme Court, the Supreme Court should grant stays at least pending the
briefing of the issues in the Supreme Court.' In addition, it is a matter of
48. Id. 1116.
49. In both Texas and Oklahoma, the governor has the authority to grant clemency, but
may only do so if the state's pardons and parole board recommends clemency. Thus, on a state
level, both the board and the governor would have to act favorably to grant clemency. In both
states, however, the governor has the authority to grant a temporary reprieve (thirty-day re-
prieve in Texas; sixty-day reprieve in Oklahoma). TEx. CONST. art. 4 § 11; OKLA. CONST. art.
VI, § 10.
50. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, 1 115 (June 27).
51. In their dissents in Breard, Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg would have
granted a stay until the issues could have been fully briefed and considered. Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371, 379-81 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting; Breyer, J., dissenting; Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Similarly, in the LaGrand litigation, Justices Breyer and Stevens would have
granted a stay pending briefing. F.R.G. v. United States, 526 U.S. 111(1999) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting). More recently, in a case involving one of the Mexican nationals who is also part of
the Avena litigation, Justices Stevens and Breyer took stronger positions respecting a denial of
[Vol. 25:117
Compliance with ICJ Provisional Measures
judicial comity for the Supreme Court to respect the request of another
court, here the ICJ, to preserve the situation until the pending case can
be heard. 2
What other measures should be taken by the United States to comply
with the provisional measures order of the ICJ? The most critical actors
for ensuring compliance are at the state level. Because both Texas and
Oklahoma have executive clemency, the appropriate authorities should
stay the executions. The State Department should enter into discussions
with the governors to impress upon them the importance of complying
with the ICJ's order. What if the parole boards or governors refuse to
stay the executions? What other "measures" could the United States
take? Professor Quigley has suggested that the United States Attorney• 3
General should sue to enjoin the state from carrying out the execution.
Such an action may be rare, but it is not unprecedented,4 and it is a
"measure" at the disposal of the United States. Professor Vazquez has
certiorari. Justice Stevens indicated that the use of procedural default to bar a hearing on the
VCCR claim violates the treaty and is "manifestly unfair" after the LaGrand decision. Torres
v. Mullin, 317 E3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. (forthcoming 2003) (No. 03-
5781, 2003 Term), slip op. at 2 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). Justice Breyer
summarized the arguments of the defense and Mexico that the ICJ decision was controlling
and would have deferred consideration of the petition pending the outcome of the Avena litiga-
tion. Id. at 6-7 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/03relatingtoorders.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
52. For a discussion of judicial comity in the context of the Breard case, see Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Agora: Breard-Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 708 (1998). See also Too
Sovereign?, supra note 5, at 2671-72 (suggesting that either the Supreme Court or the Presi-
dent could stay an execution in response to provisional measures). But see Weisburd, supra
note 5, at 924-28 (criticizing the arguments that the Supreme Court could or should issue a
stay in response to provisional measures such as those in Breard on the grounds that comity
pertains to a choice of forum issue, not mere respect or deference to another court, and that the
Court does not issue stays unless there is a likelihood of reviewing the legal issue).
53. John Quigley, LaGrand: A Challenge to the U.S. Judiciary, 27 YALE J. INT'L L.
435, 440 (2002); see also Howard S. Schiffman, The LaGrand Decision: The Evolving Legal
Landscape of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in U.S. Death Penalty Cases, 42
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1099, 1127-28 (2002) (suggesting writs of mandamus and prohibi-
tion); Too Sovereign?, supra note 5, at 2672-76 (suggesting the federal government sue states
for injunctive relief in federal court; also suggesting that foreign countries should be able to
sue a state in federal court for the continuing effect of the VCCR violation or under a theory
that would limit the reach of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
54. See Quigley, supra note 53, at 440 (stating that "the Attorney General has sued
local governments that put the United States in violation of a treaty commitment"). See, e.g.,
United States v. Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 929 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 801
(1982) (granting a German diplomatic mission immunity from State taxes pursuant to an in-
ternational agreement); United States v. City of Glen Cove, 322 F Supp. 149, 152-53
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971) (concluding that, when con-
ducting "foreign affairs, the U.S. may sue to prevent state action which would violate a treaty
or obligation of the U.S."). See also William A. Schabas, The ICJ Ruling Against the United
States: Is It Really About the Death Penalty? 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 445, 451-52 (2002) (sug-
gesting injunctive relief from national courts to compel compliance with provisional measures
from international tribunals).
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also suggested that the President could issue an executive order requiring
that the execution be postponed.5 Moreover, the United States will not
be able to rely on the possible "time pressure" safety valve or undecided
effect of the provisional measures that the ICJ mentioned in LaGrand as
a factor that might have mitigated the obligation of the United States.
Mexico has requested and obtained the provisional measures before exe-
cution dates have even been set for the three defendants. Thus, there is
significantly more time for the United States to respond than there was
in LaGrand. Additionally, there is no undecided issue on the binding
nature of the order. The United States must act now on the basis of a
binding order from the ICJ.
III. REVIEW AND RECONSIDERATION
In addition to the issue of compliance with the provisional measures,
another significant issue in the Avena litigation is the meaning of "re-
view and reconsideration." In LaGrand, the ICJ found that the United
States must allow for review and reconsideration of the conviction and
sentence to comply with its obligations under the VCCR 6 Moreover, the
ICJ found that procedural bars to the consideration of the VCCR issue
failed to provide full effect to the purposes of the right under the treaty,
which again would put the United States in violation of the treaty.57
However, the ICJ indicated that the United States should accomplish the
review and reconsideration "by means of its own choosing.""8 What will
satisfy the treaty, as interpreted by the ICJ, for review and reconsidera-
tion? In Avena, Mexico is asking for a "remedy at law," which would
exclude clemency. 9 The United States has taken the position that the
availability of a clemency petition is an adequate "review and reconsid-
eration." 6
55. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Agora: Breard-Breard and the Federal Power to Require
Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683, 685-86 (1998)
(noting that, even if the courts could not enforce the ICJ Order on political question grounds,
an executive order would be a viable measure). But see WEISBURD, supra note 5 (criticizing
applicability of executive orders in this context).
56. See supra note 35, and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 32-33, and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 36, and accompanying text.
59. Application Instituting Proceedings (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. Pleadings (Avena)
128, 281(5)(3) (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/
imusorder/imus iapplication_20030109.PDF (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
60. Verbatim Record (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. Pleadings (Avena) 128, para. 98 (Jan.
21, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuscr/imus-icr2003-03_
20030121.PDF (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
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Clemency6' is an unusual aspect of the overall criminal justice sys-
tem. Although each state's process differs somewhat, all have the key
characteristic that clemency is vested in the executive, not the judicial
branch. Typically, clemency is at the discretion of either a parole board62
or a governor. Unlike legal proceedings in a court where there are de-
fined rights and procedures, clemency is virtually undefined
substantively and procedurally.63 The parole board or governor may grant
or deny clemency for any reason, with or without stating those reasons.'
It is viewed as an act of mercy.65 There is no set of factors to consider66
that might entitle a defendant to clemency. Nor is there any consistency
among states or within a given state. For example, one governor-
former Governor Ryan of Illinois-recently commuted the sentences of
all 167 death row inmates in that state.67 In contrast, there has only been
one commutation of a death sentence in Texas, which has a death row
61. Clemency includes a pardon, a commutation, and a reprieve. A pardon relieves the
defendant of the conviction and sentence. A reprieve is a temporary relief from the sentence,
such as a thirty-day stay of an execution. A commutation reduces the amount of the punish-
ment. In death penalty cases, the most common form of clemency is a commutation from the
death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment. See James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier,
May God-Or the Governor-Have Mercy: Executive Clemency and Executions in Modern
Death-Penalty Systems, 36 CRIM L. BULL. 200, 204-05 (2000).
62. In some states, the governor has the exclusive authority to grant clemency. In oth-
ers, a parole board has the exclusive authority. In still other states, including Oklahoma and
Texas, the governor has the authority to grant clemency, but only with the recommendation of
the parole board. Id. at 217. California has an unusual twist. The governor has the authority to
grant clemency, but four justices of the California Supreme Court must concur in order to
grant clemency if the defendant is a two-time felon. CALIF. CONST. art. V, § 8(a). See gener-
ally, Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Death Penalty Information, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=121&scid=ll (last visited Oct. 25, 2003)
(state-by-state information). For federal convictions, the President has the authority to grant
clemency (except for impeachment). U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
63. In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 288-95 (1998), a splin-
iered coalition of five justices found that there was a life interest that was entitled to a minimal
level of due process. For discussion, see Alyson Dinsmore, Clemency in Capital Cases: The
Need to Ensure Meaningful Review, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1825, 1847-49 (2002).
64. Clemency is described as "an act of grace." See Woodard, 253 U.S. at 285.
65. See generally Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardon-
ing Power from the King, 69 TEx. L. REV. 569, 577 (1991); Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A.
Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U. RIcH. L. REV. 289, 300
(1993); Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Not Just an Act of Mercy: The Demise of Post-Conviction Relief
anda Rightful Claim to Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REv. OF L. & Soc. CHANGE 43, 77 (1998).
66. See Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and
Its Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239 (2003) (finding no correlation with the type of clemency
structure; some indication that gender and youth increased the chances of clemency); Victoria
J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on Commutation to Ensure Jus-
tice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311, 346 (1996) (commenting on lack of
requirements for hearings, presence of petitioners, or standards).
67. See Death Penalty Information Center, Clemency: Commutations in Capital Cases
on Humanitarian Grounds, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=126&scid=13
(last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
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population of over 400 inmates, and one commutation of a death sen-
tence in Oklahoma, which has a death row population of over 100
inmates.6' Another example of the inconsistency and unpredictability of
clemency is the treatment of juveniles. For instance, the governor of
Kentucky recently commuted the sentence of a death row inmate who
69was a juvenile at the time of the crime. In contrast, Texas executed
three inmates in 2002 who were juveniles at the time of their crimes.70
The lack of standards and complete discretion of executive clemency
is zealously guarded.' This lack of substantive and procedural standards
is both the strength and the weakness of clemency. While clemency can
be viewed as a last check on injustice in the criminal process, it is also so
unpredictable and so seldom invoked that it can hardly be viewed as a
reliable part of the overall criminal justice system.72 There are no stan-
dards, no requirements, no regularized procedures, and almost no
judicial review of clemency decisions. Although a majority of the Su-
preme Court has recognized that a death row inmate retains an interest in
life, the justices found that only a minimal level of due process is re-1 4
quired for a clemency proceeding. This minimal level is satisfied by
almost any procedure. In her concurring opinion in Ohio Adult Parole
68. Id. It is possible that there will be another commutation in Oklahoma. On Decem-
ber 17, 2003, the Oklahoma governor granted a 30-day stay of execution in the case of a
Vietnamese national after the Pardon and Parole Board recommended clemency on the basis
of inadequate presentation of mitigation and failure to provide access to consular assistance.
Oklahoma Grants Stay of Vietnamese Man's Execution, REUTERS, Dec. 17, 2003, at
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=domesticNews&storylD=4011753 (last vis-
ited Jan. 15, 2003).
69. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 67. The inmate was Kevin Stanford,
whose 1989 case established the constitutionality of executing 16 and 17-year olds. Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). More recently, in a 5:4 vote, the Supreme Court declined to
accept original habeas jurisdiction of Stanford's case to review the constitutionality of juve-
nile executions. In re Stanford, 123 S.Ct. 472 (2002).
70. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 67.
71. See Beau Breslin & John J.P. Howley, Defending the Politics of Clemency, 81 OR.
L. REV. 231 (2002) (defending clemency as an executive prerogative); Janice Rogers Brown,
The Quality of Mercy, 40 UCLA L. REV. 327 (1992) (defending clemency as a means to grant
mercy outside of the legal process).
72. Dinsmore, supra note 63, at 1839-43. As of Oct. 25, 2003, clemency had been
granted in 223 capital cases since 1976. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 67. At
the same time, there are over 3,500 inmates on death row in the United States. Death Penalty
Information Center, Death Row Inmates By State, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?scid--9&did=188#state (last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
73. Breslin & Howley, supra note 71, at 236-37; Dinsmore, supra note 63, at 1843-46.
74. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence. The fifth vote was provided by Justice Stevens, who
concurred in part and dissented in part. Four members of the Court found a life interest only to
the extent of not being "summarily executed." Id. at 281 (Rehnquist, C.J., opinion joined by
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas).
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Authority v. Woodard," Justice O'Connor suggested that judicial inter-
vention might be justified if the clemency authority "flipped a coin to
determine whether to grant clemency" or "arbitrarily denied a prisoner
any access to the clemency process: 76 Justice O'Connor's examples
demonstrate how unregulated the clemency process is by any judicial
oversight. For instance, in the Faulder case cited earlier, involving the
Canadian national whose VCCR rights were violated, the defense chal-
lenged the clemency process as a proceeding conducted in secret, with
no hearing, no reason for the decision, and no record of the action taken.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found no due process problem with
this process.7
Despite the non-judicial nature of clemency, are clemency proceed-
ings likely to satisfy the review and reconsideration requirement?
Although the ICJ in LaGrand stated that the United States could choose
its means of providing review and reconsideration, the purpose of such
proceedings was clearly to allow for a substantive hearing on a violation
of the VCCR rights of the defendant. The procedural default bar in fed-
eral habeas completely precluded any hearing on the issue. The ICJ
indicated that the use of procedural default prevented full effect being
given to the purposes of the right under the treaty. Thus, a hearing on the
merits of the VCCR issue is necessary to give full effect to the VCCR
notification right.
Is a clemency consideration a hearing on the merits of the VCCR is-
sue? As the United States argues in Avena, it is possible to consider the
VCCR issue in clemency proceedings. The State Department has sent
letters to governors requesting that they consider the VCCR issue at the
clemency stage.7' The problem with clemency as a "review and reconsid-
eration," however, is twofold. First, unless substantive guarantees and
procedures are standardized, there is no way to know if the VCCR issue
is adequately considered in a clemency petition. Second, the purpose of
the notification right is to allow access and assistance to the detained
foreign national in the legal system. Thus, it would be more consistent
with the VCCR provisions to require a judicial review and reconsidera-
tion.
Clemency proceedings by their very nature do not provide review
and reconsideration of legal issues. Although in some instances, a
75. 523 U.S. 272 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 289.
77. Faulder v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 178 F.3d 343, 344 (5th Cir. 1999). The
Fifth Circuit viewed Woodard's minimal procedural safeguards as satisfied by Texas' process
which allowed Faulder to provide any information he chose to the Board. Id. at 344-45.
78. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378 (1998) (referring to letter of Secre-
tary of State to Governor of Virginia requesting a stay).
Fall 2003]
Michigan Journal of International Law
governor or parole board might decide to commute a sentence based on a
lack of due process in the proceedings, there is no requirement that the
executive do so. In other words, a governor or parole board might find
that there was a complete denial of the right to counsel in a criminal case
and yet choose not to commute a sentence. Similarly, even if the
executive authority found an egregious effect from a VCCR violation,
there is no standard that requires any relief, nor is there any procedure
for a review of that decision. Thus, calling the clemency proceeding a
"review and reconsideration" by the governor or parole board is truly
form over substance.79
Moreover, the point of the "review and reconsideration" is to give
full effect to the purpose of the right of consular notification. In its 1999
advisory opinion, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that
the consular notification right was part of the due process guarantees of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)80 The
purpose, according to the Inter-American Court, was informational. The
defendant had a right to information necessary for his or her defense. 8'
Although the Inter-American Court opinion is only advisory as to the
United States, the Court is a body charged with the interpretation of
relevant treaties." While the decision from the Inter-American Court is
not binding on the ICJ, it is possible that the ICJ will consider the posi-
tion of the Inter-American Court in its own decision on the interpretation
of the same treaty. As a significant part of the process due a detained
foreign national, the consular notification right can affect the outcome of
the criminal proceedings.8 ' Thus, the reliability of the conviction and
sentence are at stake. Where clemency is completely at the discretion of
the governor, there is no bona fide check on the reliability of the convic-
tion and sentence. 84 In contrast, judicial review is characterized by
standards and procedures. The courts must apply the legal standards and
provide relief as required under law. A review and reconsideration by a
court on the merits of the VCCR issue would not be a whimsical event.
79. For a critique of clemency, see Palacios, supra note 66 (describing the ineffective-
ness of clemency). See generally Breslin & Howley, supra note 71; Dinsmore, supra note 63.
80. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in
the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R., Ser. A, No. 16
(1999).
81. Id. 124.
82. See generally Richard J. Wilson, The United States' Position on the Death Penalty
in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1159 (2002).
83. For a discussion of consular assistance, see John Cary Sims & Linda E. Carter,
Representing Foreign Nationals: Emerging Importance of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations as a Defense Tool, 22 THE CHAMPION 28 (1998).
84. See Palacios, supra note 66, at 370 (summarizing the inability of clemency as pres-
ently used to remedy errors in the imposition of the death penalty and commenting on the
political liability of governors and parole boards as inhibiting clemency decisions).
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Just as procedural default barred consideration of the VCCR claim in
LaGrand, clemency provides no guarantee of review and consideration
in any case. There is only the possibility of a consideration of the VCCR
violation at the complete, unreviewable discretion of a governor or pa-
role board.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Avena litigation in the International Court of Justice is charting
a new course in the effect of treaties on domestic criminal cases with its
adjudication of issues involving the Vienna Convention on Consular Re-
lations. Two important aspects of the Avena case are the adequacy of
measures to comply with the provisional measures order and the suffi-
ciency of clemency as a review and reconsideration mechanism.
The effect of the provisional measures order on the United States
should be significantly different than it was when provisional measures
were issued in the LaGrand and Breard cases. The status of provisional
measures was unclear prior to the ICJ's decision in LaGrand, which held
that the provisional orders are binding .8 Thus, there is nothing equivocal
about the binding nature of the provisional measures order in Avena. A
binding provisional measures order from the ICJ calls for a different re-
sponse than the United States gave in the earlier cases. First, it is
incumbent upon the states affected, Oklahoma and Texas, to respond
under their state laws to abide by the provisional measures order and
stay the executions. On the federal level, there should be increased ef-
forts by the State Department to educate and convince the states to
comply. In addition, legal actions in court filed by the federal govern-
ment against the states to force compliance with the provisional order are
"measures at its disposal" and possibly "measures necessary" to ensure
that the executions do not occur.
The claim by the United States that executive clemency is an
adequate review and reconsideration of a conviction and sentence where
there has been a VCCR violation is the ultimate expression of form over
substance. Although the ICJ indicated in LaGrand that the United States
could use "means of its own choosing" to satisfy the review and
86reconsideration requirement, it seems clear that the intent of the ICJ
was that the means would be adequate to allow for a hearing and
substantive consideration of the VCCR violation. With its standardless,
unreviewable nature, clemency provides no guarantee of either a hearing
85. See supra note 28, and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 36, and accompanying text.
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or a consideration of a VCCR violation. The clemency authority need
not take into account any particular claim. Moreover, even if the
clemency authority listens to the VCCR claim, it is free to disregard the
merits regardless of their strength. There is no control over the content of
clemency proceedings and little control over the procedures employed. A
"review and reconsideration" of a conviction and sentence because of a
VCCR violation where the reviewing authority is free to refuse to listen
or to consider the claim would fail any interpretation of the ICJ decision
in LaGrand. The treaty itself mandates that the receiving State's law
must yield if it fails to give full effect to the purposes of the right under
the treaty.87 A right to notification and consular assistance is meaningless
if there is no forum in which the reviewing authority is required to give
effect to the right under defined standards.
As the Avena litigation progresses in the ICJ, the issues of compli-
ance with provisional measures and the adequacy of clemency as a
review and reconsideration will be among the most closely watched is-
sues. The reaction of state and federal executive authorities, as well as
the decisions in the courts in the United States, should incorporate a bet-
ter understanding of, and compliance with, international treaties. The
resolution of these issues will continue the slow, but ongoing, process of
increased recognition of treaty obligations in domestic criminal cases.
87. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 36(2) ("The rights ... shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws ... of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the
said laws ... must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under this Article are intended").
[Vol. 25:117
